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Abstract. The purpose of the covert communication system is to imple-
ment the communication process without causing third party perception.
In order to achieve complete covert communication, two aspects of secu-
rity issues need to be considered. The first one is to cover up the existence
of information, that is, to ensure the content security of information; the
second one is to cover up the behavior of transmitting information, that
is, to ensure the behavioral security of communication. However, most
of the existing information hiding models are based on the “Prisoners’
Model”, which only considers the content security of carriers, while ig-
noring the behavioral security of the sender and receiver. We think that
this is incomplete for the security of covert communication. In this pa-
per, we propose a new covert communication framework, which considers
both content security and behavioral security in the process of informa-
tion transmission. In the experimental part, we analyzed a large amount
of collected real Twitter data to illustrate the security risks that may
be brought to covert communication if we only consider content security
and neglect behavioral security. Finally, we designed a toy experiment,
pointing out that in addition to most of the existing content steganog-
raphy, under the proposed new framework of covert communication, we
can also use user’s behavior to implement behavioral steganography. We
hope this new proposed framework will help researchers to design better
covert communication systems.
Keywords: Covert Communication · Content Security · Behavioral Se-
curity · Behavioral Steganography.
1 Introduction
Covert communication system, encryption system and privacy system are three
basic information security systems which have been summarized by Claude E.
Shannon [1]. These three types of information security systems protect people’s
information security and privacy in cyberspace from different aspects. Among
them, the encryption system mainly encrypts important information, makes the
unauthorized people cannot decode and read normally, so as to ensure informa-
tion security [2]. The privacy system mainly controls the access to important
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information and thus ensures the security of information [3]. These two systems
can only guarantee the security of information content, but can not cover up the
behavior of transmitting secret information. The most important characteristic
of a covert communication system is that it can conceal the fact of transmit-
ting secret information, that is, to complete the communication process without
causing suspicion from third parties.
In order to achieve truly effective covert communication and avoid being
perceived by third parties, there are two aspects of security issues that need
to be considered: the concealment of information content and the concealment
of information transmission behavior, which correspond to content security and
behavioral security, respectively. For a covert communication process, these two
issues are indispensable, and they together ensure the concealment and security
of the communication process.
Currently, most covert communication systems are under the framework of
“Prisoners’ Model” [4], which is described in detail as follows. Alice and Bob
are two prisoners locked in different cells in the prison. They are planning a
jailbreak. They are allowed to communicate with each other, but all communi-
cate information must be reviewed by guard Eve. Once Eve finds that they are
transmitting secret information, they will be handed over to a cell with the high-
est security level where they will never be able to escape from. Therefore, they
intend to use covert communication methods to embed secret information into
common carriers, such as images [5], voices [6], texts [7], and then communicat-
ing with each other. Such information hiding technology is called steganography.
Eve’s task is to determine as accurately as possible whether the information they
are transmitting contains secret information. The technology she uses is called
steganalysis.
In the past few decades, with the development of technology, the steganog-
raphy and steganalysis methods under the framework of the “Prisoners’ Model”
have achieved rapid development and progress on various carriers [5–11,11–13].
However, with the development of these steganography and steganalysis tech-
niques, we have noticed the limitations of “Prisoners’ Model” which only focus
on content security.
A typical communication system consists of three important components: an
information sender, a communication channel and an information receiver [1].
The task of the sender is to generate and send information, which can be in
the form of images, voices, texts and so on. The communication channel is to
pass the signal generated by the sender to the receiver. The receiver is to receive
the information carrier transmitted from the channel and obtain the informa-
tion therein. Simmons’ “Prisoners’ Model” only emphasizes content security in
the process of information transmission, but ignores the behavioral security of
the sender and the receiver. In the scenario it assumes, it even has a very strong
assumption that Alice and Bob are allowed to communicate point-to-point. How-
ever, in reality, it might be that Alice and Bob’s behavior of establishing such
point-to-point communication alone is enough to arouse suspicion from others,
thus failing to achieve truly covert communication. Therefore, if we want to re-
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alize the truly concealment of transmitting secret information, in addition to
ensuring the content security in the communication channel, we should also con-
side the behavioral security of both sender and receiver of the communication
system.
In this paper, we propose a new security framework of covert communication
system, which considers both content security and behavioral security in the
process of information transmission. We collected and analyzed the behavioral of
a large number of active Twitter users, trying to illustrate the security risks that
may be brought to covert communication if we only consider content security
and neglect behavioral security. Finally, we designed a toy experiment, pointing
out that in addition to most of the existing content steganography, under the
proposed new framework of covert communication, we can even only rely on user
behavior to achieve behavioral steganography, which may bring new ideas and
methods to the future covert communication.
In the remainder of this paper, Section II introduces several related works.
Section III describes the proposed framework in detail. In section IV, we analyzed
the behavioral of a large number of active Twitter users and conducted a series
of analytical experiments. Finally, conclusions are drawn in Section V.
2 Related Works
2.1 Steganography and Steganalysis under the “Prisoners’ Model”
Previous information hiding methods which under the framework of the “Prison-
ers’ Model” [4] mainly focuse on content security, they try to find the best way
to hide secret information into common carriers. These steganographic meth-
ods can be divided into different types according to different kinds of carrier,
like image steganography [5], text steganography [7], audio steganography [6]
and so on. In addition, according to different steganography means, they can
also be classified to modification-based steganography [5] and generation-based
steganography [6, 7].
Figure 1 shows the overall framework of the “Prisoners’ Model” and we can
model it in the following mathematical form. Assuming that there are three
spaces: carrier space C, key space K, and secret message space M. The process
of information hiding can be represented by the function f(). If Alice adopts a
steganographic method based on the modification mode, she selects a common
carrier c from the carrier space C, which can be an image, voice or text. Then,
under the control of the secret key kA from the key space K, Alice embeds the
secret information m into the carrier c by modifying it, that is:
Emb : C × K ×M→ S, fmod(c, kA,m) = s. (1)
Correspondingly, if Alice adopts the steganographic method based on the carrier
automatic generation, she does not need to be given a carrier in advance. She
can automatically generate a steganographic carrier s according to the secret
information m that needs to be transmitted, that is:
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Alice
Emb: 
f(c, K஺, m) = s
Bob
Ext: 
g(s, K஻) = m
Covert Communication
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Cover StegoSteganalysis
Fig. 1. Steganography and steganalysis within the framework of “Prisoners’ Model”.
Emb : K ×M→ S, fgen(kA,m) = s. (2)
When Bob receives the carrier s containing secret information from Alice,
under the control of the decoding key kB , he can extract the embedded secret
message m from the steganographic carrier s by using the corresponding extrac-
tion function g(), that is:
Ext : S × K →M, g(s, kB) = m. (3)
In order not to arouse suspicion of Eve and ensure the security of secret
information, according to Cachin’s analysis of steganographic security [14], Alice
and Bob should try their best to reduce the statistical distribution differences
between normal carriers and steganographic carriers, that is:
df (PC , PS) ≤ εf . (4)
Among them, PC and PS represent the statistical distribution of normal carriers
and steganographic carriers respectively. εf is a number greater than 0, which can
be used to measure the concealment of steganographic algorithm f(). For Eve,
her job is to analyze and judge whether the information carrier being transmitted
has deviated from the statistical distribution of the normal carriers, and then
determine whether the carrier contains secret information.
The limitation of “Prisoners’ Model” is that it only considers the content
security in the communication process and ignores the behavioral security of the
communication ends, which we think is incomplete for achieving truly effective
covert communication.
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2.2 Behavioral Concealment and Behavioral Analysis
At present, most covert communication models mainly focus on the content se-
curity of the information transmitted in the intermediate channel, but in fact,
both ends of the communication system can also participate in the entire covert
communication process. For example, during World War II, some people used
several specific behaviors agreed in advance to convey covert information [15].
In recent years, some researchers have begun to study how to use specific online
behaviors to convey covert information. For example, N. Pantic et al. [16] pro-
posed a steganographic method that represents different secret information by
controlling the length of Twitter published. X. Zhang [17] suggested that differ-
ent secret messages could be conveyed by giving “love” marks to the information
on social media. S. Li et al. [15] defined a “bits to activities” mapping algorithm
and tried to use different online behaviors to convey secret message.
These covert communication methods can be implemented smoothly because
they utilize the blind area of current steganalysis methods under the “Prisoners’
Model” framework, that is, the lack of modeling and analysis of user’s behavior.
However, it is noteworthy that in recent years, with the development of technol-
ogy, more and more methods for detecting abnormal behaviors on the Internet
have emerged [18–21]. In this case, if we still only consider the content security
in the covert communication process, without considering the behavior security,
it will bring a great security risk to the entire covert communication system no
matter how concealment the secret information is embedded.
3 The Proposed Framework
In order to describe the proposed framework more conveniently, we first describe
a virtual scene. We assume that Alice and Bob are two intelligence personnel dis-
guised as ordinary people. Their job is to gather intelligence. They have sneaked
into two different target hostile areas and each of them have collected some
intelligence information. Now they need to communicate with each other, ex-
change the information they have acquired and verify them with each other in
order to make the best decisions. However, due to previous actions, these two
areas have been suspected by the enemy, which can be collectively refered as
Eve. Eve suspects that Alice and Bob have infiltrated these two areas, but she
is not sure who they are. She was authorized to review all the communications
between these two regions in the hope of finding Alice and Bob. According to
Kerckhoffs’s principle [1], we can expand Eve’s capabilities as much as possible.
We assume that Eve can get the content of each communication between any
two people in these two regions, so she can perform steganalysis by analyzing
the statistical distribution characteristics of the communication content. In ad-
dition, she can also know the communication behavior between any two people
in these two regions, so she can also perform steganalysis by analyzing the com-
munication behavior. We should also assume that Eve is familiar with all kinds
of steganographic algorithms that Alice and Bob may adopt, and only does not
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Fig. 2. Covert communication in public cyberspace.
know the specific steganography parameters (i.e. the secret key) that Alice and
Bob adopt.
For Alice and Bob, in order to successfully accomplish the task and ensure
their own safety, they need to consider two aspects of security. Firstly, they
need to ensure that the information they transmit is well concealed and not
easily to be detected; secondly, they should behave as normal as possible and
thus not expose themselves. They first ruled out the use of encryption meth-
ods to transmit information, because the transmission of encrypted information
in the public channel will likely arouse suspicions. They eventually choose to
use steganographic methods for covert communication. But only assurance the
content concealment of each point-to-point communication as required by the
“Prisoners’ Model” is obviously not enough. They need to disguise themselves
as normal people in a public communication network, cover up their behavior of
exchanging secret information, and ensure the content security of each commu-
nication at the same time, thus they can achieve real covert communication.
The framework of the whole scenario is shown in Figure 2 and the mathemat-
ical descriptions for this scenario and task are as follows. We define the entire
public communication network as a graph series G = {Gt}Tt=1, where Gt denotes
the graph at the t-th moment. Graph Gt of time step t is composed of vertices
set Vt and edges set Et, that is:
G = {Gt}Tt=1. s.t. ∀t ∈ [1, T ], Gt = {Vt, Et ⊆ (Vt × Vt)}. (5)
The vertices in Gt represent the users in the social network and edges represent
the connections between users:
∀i, j ∈ [1, N ],∀t ∈ [1, T ],
Vt = ∪Nn=1{vit}, Et = ∪{ei,jt }|i,j∈[1,N ], ei,jt : vit → vjt .
(6)
We can represent Alice and Bob in this public network as vA and vB . With-
out affecting the nature of this problem, for the convenience of the following
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discussion, we assume that all the secret information is sent by Alice and ex-
tracted by Bob. According to the previous description, in order to achieve real
covert communication, we need to consider both content security and behavioral
security in the communication process. At the same time, we notice from Figure
2 that the content and behavior of each user in the network have instantaneous
and temporal characteristics. Next we will discuss and model them separately.
– Instantaneous Content Security
In order to ensure instantaneous content security, Alice and Bob only need to
ensure that at each time, the difference in the statistical distribution char-
acteristics of the carrier they are transmitting and the normal carriers is
small enough. This is very similar to formula (1) - (4). We assume that at
time step t, Alice needs to pass a covert message mt to Bob. Alice selects
a carrier ct from the carrier space C, uses a steganographic function ft() to
embed the secret information mt into common carrier ct under the guidance
of the secret key kAt ∈ K, and gets the steganographic carrier st. To mini-
mize the impact on the statistical features distributions of carriers, so as to
avoid arousing suspicion of other people about the transmission content, the
steganographic function ft() needs to satisfy the following constraints:
∀t ∈ [1, T ],
ft(ct, k
A
t ,mt) = st,
gt(st, k
B
t ) = mt,
d1(PC , PS) ≤ ε1.
(7)
Where gt() and k
B
t are the extraction function and the extraction key cor-
responding to ft() and k
A
t , respectively. PC and PS represent the statistical
distribution characteristics of the normal carriers and the steganographic
carriers, respectively, and d1() is a measurement function for measuring
the statistical distribution difference between the normal carriers and the
steganographic carriers. ε1 is a value greater than 0 and it measures the
security of the steganographic function ft(). The smaller the value of ε1, the
stronger the concealment of ft().
– Temporal Content Security
However, it is not enough to only guarantee the content security of a single
communication. For users in social networks, according to their own interests
and characteristics, usually the contents they publish or pay attention to
have a certain relevance. Therefore, for Alice and Bob, the content they
upload and download should also have a certain temporal correlation. For
example, if a person is a big fan of basketball and his social media content
in the past short term is sports-related, then we have reason to guess that
the next content may also be sports-related. Or if a person always publishes
negative content on social media for a long time, we can also estimate that
the emotions contained in the following content may be negative. Conversely,
if a social account publishes multiple messages in a short period of time (e.g.
within an hour) and the topic changes frequently, or emotional switching
frequently, we can at least suspect that the account is unusually. We use
cit1:t2 to represent the sequence of information published or downloaded by
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user vi during the period from t1 to t2. Suppose H() is a function which can
measure the temporal relevance of sequence information. Therefore, in order
to achieve temporal content security, Alice and Bob should ensure:
∀t1, t2 ∈ [1, T ], t1 < t2,
{
d2(H(s
A
t1:t2), H(ct1:t2)) ≤ ε2.
d2(H(s
B
t1:t2), H(ct1:t2)) ≤ ε2.
(8)
Where H(ct1:t2) represents the average score of a large number of sequence
social information published by normal users. d2() reflects the difference
between temporal relevance score of sequence social information published
by Alice and normal users. ε2 is a value greater than 0, the smaller it is, the
stronger the concealment.
– Instantaneous Behavioral Security
For each moment t ∈ [1, T ], the behavioral security of each user vit in cy-
berspace can be divided into two aspects: one is the behavioral security of
himself, the other is the contacts with the people around him, that is, the
behavioral security of a single vertex and the edges around it. Extreme ex-
amples such like Bob only downloads information published by Alice, or
Alice publishs an unusually large amount of content in a very short time (for
example, 100 images in one minute), may bring risks of suspicion. Here, we
define two behavior scoring functions I() and J() to analyze the behavior
of vertexes and edges in the public network, respectively. Then to achieve
instantaneous behavioral security, Alice and Bob’s behavior at each moment
needs to meet the following constraints:
∀t ∈ [1, T ],
d3(I(v
A
t ), I(vt)) ≤ ε3, d3(I(vBt ), I(vt)) ≤ ε3,
d4(J(E
A
t ), J(Et)) ≤ ε4, d4(J(EBt ), J(Et)) ≤ ε4.
(9)
Where EAt and E
B
t represents all the edge sets associated with Alice and Bob
at t-th time step, and I(vt) and J(Et) represent the average behavior score
of the normal users and their connections, respectively. For instantaneous
behavioral security, the statistical distribution difference between Alice’s and
Bob’s online behavior and that of normal users’ behavior should be less than
a threshold ε3 and ε4.
– Temporal Behavioral Security
A.F.Costa et al. [18] and Y.T.Daniel et al. [19] have found that for many
ordinary users, when logging in and using these social media, their behavioral
records have a significant time distribution. This shows that users may have
their own habits of using these social media and these behavior on social
media is likely to have a temporal correlation. For example, some people
are accustomed to watching a video on social media before going to bed, or
browsing their friends’ information and commenting on social media after
getting up every day. From the perspective of behavioral security, it would
be much less likely for Alice and Bob to expose themselves if they found
a large number of normal users’ usage habits and statistical characteristics
and then imitated their usage habits. The temporal characteristics of users’
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Fig. 3. The overall framework for covert communication in public networks.
online behavior can also be divided into two aspects: vertex behavior and
edge behavior, then the constraints should be:

∀t1, t2 ∈ [1, T ], t1 < t2,
d5(H(v
A
t1:t2), H(vt1:t2)) ≤ ε5, d5(H(vBt1:t2), H(vt1:t2)) ≤ ε5.
d6(H(E
A
t1:t2), H(Et1:t2)) ≤ ε6, d6(H(EBt1:t2), H(Et1:t2)) ≤ ε6.
(10)
Where H(vAt1:t2), H(v
B
t1:t2) and H(E
A
t1:t2), H(E
B
t1:t2) represent the temporal rele-
vance of their sequential behavior of Alice and Bob themselves and their interac-
tion with the people around them, respectively. H(vt1:t2) and H(Et1:t2) represent
the corresponding distribution characteristics of ordinary users. To ensure tem-
poral behavioral security, the difference of their distribution should be less than
the threshold ε5 and ε6.
Based on the above analysis, the overall framework for covert communication
in public networks has been summarised in Figure 3, and in order to achieve real
covert communication, the security constraints that Alice and Bob need to meet
are shown in Table 1.
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Steganographic
Security Single Communication Continuous Communication
Content Security ∀𝑡 ∈ 1, 𝑇 , ൞
𝑓௧ 𝑐௧, 𝑘௧஺,𝑚௧ = 𝑠௧
𝑔௧ 𝑠௧, 𝑘௧஻ = 𝑚௧
𝑑ଵ(𝑃஼, 𝑃ௌ) ≤ 𝜀ଵ
∀𝑡ଵ, 𝑡ଶ ∈ 1, 𝑇 , 𝑡ଵ < 𝑡ଶ
𝑑ଶ 𝐻 𝑠௧భ:௧మ
஺ , 𝐻 𝑐௧భ:௧మ ≤ 𝜀ଶ
𝑑ଶ 𝐻 𝑠௧భ:௧మ
஻ , 𝐻 𝑐௧భ:௧మ ≤ 𝜀ଶ
Behavioral Security ൞
∀𝑡 ∈ 1, 𝑇
𝑑ଷ 𝐼 𝑣௧஺ , 𝐼 𝑣௧ ≤ 𝜀ଷ, 𝑑ଷ 𝐼 𝑣௧஻ , 𝐼 𝑣௧ ≤ 𝜀ଷ
𝑑ସ 𝐽 𝐸௧஺ , 𝐽 𝐸௧ ≤ 𝜀ସ, 𝑑ସ 𝐽 𝐸௧஻ , 𝐽 𝐸௧ ≤ 𝜀ସ
∀𝑡ଵ, 𝑡ଶ ∈ 1, 𝑇 , 𝑡ଵ < 𝑡ଶ
𝑑ହ 𝐻 𝑣௧భ:௧మ
஺ , 𝐻 𝑣௧భ:௧మ ≤ 𝜀ହ, 𝑑ହ 𝐻 𝑣௧భ:௧మ
஻ , 𝐻 𝑣௧భ:௧మ ≤ 𝜀ହ
𝑑଺ 𝐻 𝐸௧భ:௧మ
஺ , 𝐻 𝐸௧భ:௧మ ≤ 𝜀଺, 𝑑଺ 𝐻 𝐸௧భ:௧మ
஻ , 𝐻 𝐸௧భ:௧మ ≤ 𝜀଺
Table 1. Steganographic security constraints for covert communication systems.
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4 Experiments and Analysis
In this section, we first analyzed the crawled Twitter user behavior and content
characteristics from some aspects. And then we analyze the possible risks if we
only consider content security without considering behavior security. Finally, we
designed a toy experiment, pointing out that in addition to most of the existing
content steganography, in the proposed new framework of covert communication,
we can even only rely on user behavior to achieve behavioral steganography.
4.1 Data Collection and Analysis
According to the previous section, in order to achieve truly effective covert com-
munication, Alice and Bob need to cover up themselves from both content and
behavior aspects. To achieve this goal, we first need to analyze the content and
behavioral characteristics of a large number of normal users on public networks.
In this work, we crawled 317,375 tweets from 1,147 active Twitter users (de-
fined as publish Twitter messages more than 90 in a month) for the period from
2019-06-15 00:00:00 to 2019-07-15 23:59:59. Some detail information about these
users and tweets can be found in Table 2.
Table 2. Some detail information about the crawled twitter users and tweets
User Number Tweet Number Rate of retweet Average forwarding
1,147 317,375 34.55% 151.0
Average comments Average follower Average following
1871.7 23,036 8761.2
We made some statistical analyses of these crawled Tweets, and the results
are shown in Figure 4. From these results, we can at least see that when these
unrelated users publish content on social networks, their behavior will show a
regular distribution on the whole, rather than disorder. For example, Figure
4 (b) reflects the relationship between the total number of Twitters and the
rate of original Twitters published by these active users in a month. It forms
a very regular fan-shaped distribution. If Alice ignores these statistical rules,
Twitter publishing falls outside the sector. Even if the content she publishes is
normal, it may be recognized as abnormal behavior and expose herself. Figure
4(d) shows the statistical distribution of the average number of Twitters posted
by users within 24 hours a day. They also form a very regular distribution. If
the time when Alice publishes information does not coincide with that of most
people, such as always publishing information at the lowest point of normal
people’s probability of republishingleasing information, it may also be considered
abnormal.
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Fig. 4. Some statistical distribution characteristics of online behaviors of active twitter
users.
In addition, from the perspective of content security, we analyzed in Section
III that social information published by users (especially active users) is likely to
have temporal content relevance. We use the VADER model proposed in [22] to
analyze the sentiment of crawling Twitters. The sentiment score of each Twitter
is distributed between [-1,1]. The closer the value is to 1, the more positive it
is, and the closer it is to -1, the more negative it is. Then, we use permutation
entropy [23] to calculate the random degree of Twitter sentiment values of these
active users within a month. As a measure, permutation entropy (PE) is widely
used in the analysis, prediction and detection tasks of time series. The value of
PE (in a range of [0,1]) represents the degree of randomness or predictability of
the time series, the closer to 0, the more regular the sequence is.
In contrast, we have also constructed 100 virtual users and used recently
appeared steganographic text generation algorithm [7] to generate 100 stegano-
graphic twitters for each virtual user. Then we use the same method to calculate
the sentiment value of each steganographic Twitter and then use permutation
entropy to calculate its random degree. We use different embedding rates (bits
per word) to generate multiple sets of Twitters, and the final test results are
shown in Figure 5.
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Fig. 5. The permutation entropy distribution of sentiment values of Twitter published
by normal users within one month and steganographic Twitter generated by model
proposed in [7].
As can be seen from Figure 5, the PE distribution of steganographic Twitter
(regardless of embedding rate) generated is very close to 1, which means that
the sentiment values of these Twitters are almost random sequences. In contrast,
the PE distribution of real Twitter published by normal active users is closer
to 0, indicating that the real user generated Twitter sequence has a certain
predictability of sentiment state. This further validates our previous analysis
that no matter how concealment the steganographic samples generated by Alice
each time, once the temporal correlation is ignored, it is very likely to expose
itself.
These analyses show that a large number of normal users’ online content and
behavior have certain statistical characteristics, and neglecting any aspect of
them will bring security risks, so that effective covert communication cannot be
realized. Therefore, in order to achieve real covert communication, whether single
communication or continuous communication, we need to consider both content
security and behavioral security to ensure the concealment of communication.
4.2 Behavioral Steganography Based on Posting Time
In fact, by effectively expanding the “Prisoners’ Model”, on the one hand, it
brings greater challenges to Alice and Bob, but on the other hand, it also brings
them new ideas of steganography. They may even not need to modify the con-
tent of the original carrier, only use the online behavior to transmit secret infor-
mation, which can be called behavioral steganography. In this section, we will
present a very simple but effective method, to illustrate how can we conduct
behavioral steganography.
The steganography models based on the “Prisoners’ Model” usually need
to analyze the statistical distribution characteristics of the normal carrier, and
then modify the insensitive features of it and thus to embed secret information.
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This kind of methods can be called content steganography. Similarly, in order
to implement behavioral steganography, we first need to analyze the statistical
distribution characteristics of a large number of normal users’ behaviors.
Figure 4(d) shows the statistical distribution of the posting time within 24
hours a day. Therefore, we can consider using the behavior of posting time to
transmit secret information. For example, if Alice divides each day into hours,
she can get 24 time periods for sending information and also the probability of
sending information in each time hour according to Figure 4(d), that is :{{h1, h2, ..., h24},
{P (h1), P (h2), ..., P (h24)}. (11)
Then Alice can construct a Huffman tree and encode each time period ac-
cording to the corresponding probability. Each leaf node represents a period of
time, and the encoding rule can be 0 on the left and 1 on the right. The Huffman
coding for each time period can be find in Table 3.
Table 3. Huffman code table for each posting time during one day.
O’clock Code O’clock Code O’clock Code O’clock Code O’clock Code O’clock Code
0-1 11001 1-2 11011 2-3 11000 3-4 10110 4-5 10011 5-6 01010
6-7 01011 7-8 10010 8-9 10100 9-10 10101 10-11 10111 11-12 11100
12-13 11111 13-14 0100 14-15 1000 15-16 0111 16-17 0110 17-18 0011
18-19 0010 19-20 0000 20-21 0001 21-22 11110 22-23 11101 23-24 11010
Then each time according to the secret bit stream, Alice searches from the
root node of Huffman tree until the corresponding leaf node is found, indicating
that the steganographic information should be sent out in the corresponding
time. We simulated Alice to transmit secret information at a specified time using
the above method and embed random bit streams into the sending time. We
simulated Alice sending 5,000 messages, and then we counted the distribution of
these sending times, results have been shown in Figures 6. From figure 6, we can
see that for this steganographic method, while transmitting hidden information,
Alice can still obey the statistical characteristics of normal users’ behavior, so
it can achieve a certain degree of behavioral security. At the same time, it is
worth noting that Alice has not made any changes to the carrier content, so the
content security can also be guaranteed.
Although this is just a simple example of using network behavior to carry
covert information. But it proves that we can jump out of the scope of content
security, and only use the behavior to achieve covert communication. We think
that this may inspire more new types of covert communication technologies and
methods in the future.
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Fig. 6. The statistical distribution difference between the steganographic behavior and
the real behavior after carrying the covert information with the transmission time.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we propose a new covert communication framework, which consid-
ers both content security and behavioral security in the process of information
transmission. We give a complete security constraint under the proposed new
framework of covert communication. In the experimental part, we use a large
amount of collected real Twitter data to illustrate the security risks that may
be brought to covert communication if we only consider content security and
neglect behavioral security. Finally, we designed a toy experiment, pointing out
that in addition to most of the existing content steganography, in the proposed
new framework of covert communication, we can even only rely on user behav-
ior to achieve behavioral steganography. We think this new proposed framework
is an important development to the current covert communication system. We
hope that this paper will serve as a reference guide for researchers to facilitate
the design and implementation of better covert communication systems.
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